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Abstract
In this paper we develop a structural model for job search behavior of stu-
dents entering the labor market. The model includes endogenous search
effort and on-the-job search. Since students usually do not start a regular
job before graduation but start job search earlier, our model is non sta-
tionary even if all structural parameters are constant. The model explains
the common finding that a substantial share of individuals starts working
immediately upon graduation. We estimate the model using a unique data
set of individuals who completed undergraduate education in the Nether-
lands between 1995 and 2001. Our estimation results show that a 1 percent
point decrease in unemployment rate increases wage offers with 3 percent,
that there are substantial returns to work experience and that individuals
devote less effort to job search than optimal. Employment rates at grad-
uation could be increased from 40 percent to 65 percent if all individuals
start job search 6 month prior to graduation.
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1 Introduction
Students anticipate the moment of graduation by searching for work already some
period before graduating (e.g. Wolpin, 1987). Therefore, a substantial share of
students starts working immediately after completing education (e.g. Bowlus,
Kiefer and Neumann, 2001, Ferrall, 1997, and Wolpin, 1987). Young workers
usually do not stay very long in their first job. Topel and Ward (1992) argue
that young workers are searching for good matches, i.e. high paying jobs. Job-to-
job transitions are often associated to wage increases and the behavior of young
workers is largely consistent with job search theory. The high job turnover and
fast wage growth can be the result of the existence of frictions within a stationary
labor market environment faced by individuals. An alternative explanation for
high job mobility and increasing wages is that the returns to work experience
for new entrants in the labor market are relatively high. This implies that the
labor market conditions faced by young workers change after they start working
in their first job.
In this paper we develop a model describing labor market behavior of individ-
uals around the moment of completing undergraduate education. Our model is a
discrete-time job search model (see e.g. Mortensen, 1986, for an extensive discus-
sion on models describing individual job search behavior). Unlike most empirical
studies of individual labor market behavior, which take job search effort exoge-
nously, we explicitly model the amount of job search effort (see Bloemen, 2004;
Fouge`re, Pradel and Roger, 2002; Stern, 1989; and Yoon, 1981; for structural
empirical analyses of job search models with endogenous search effort). Addi-
tionally, we model the optimal moment at which individuals start searching for
work, which often precedes the date of graduation. The optimal timing of start-
ing job search depends on the returns to job search and the costs of searching.
We assume that the costs function of job search effort has two components, fixed
costs made at the moment of starting job search, and flexible costs in each period
depending on the amount of job search effort. Because students usually do not
start working in regular jobs before actually graduating, the decision problem
of students is non stationary (even if all structural elements of the model are
constant over time). After the (optimal) moment of starting job search, students
increase their job search effort and lower their reservation wage each period until
the moment of graduating or accepting a job.
Our model explains the substantial share of individuals who start working im-
mediately after graduation differently from the recent economic literature. Since
we have information on the actual moment an individual starts searching for
work, we can identify the job search process prior to graduation which can differ
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between individuals. Most closely related is Wolpin (1987), who imposes that
all individuals start searching the same fixed period before graduation and that
all individuals devote the same amount of effort to job search. Other structural
empirical analyses do not explicitly model the job search process before gradua-
tion. Ferrall (1997) assumes that at the moment of leaving school all individuals
have received exactly two job offers, and are employed if the wage associated
to the best job offer exceeds the individual’s reservation wage. Bowlus, Kiefer
and Neumann (2001) ignore job search spells where an individual starts working
immediately upon leaving school. Gras and Lindeboom (1994) adopt a similar
strategy, but correct for potential selection among those who failed to find a job
before graduation.
Young workers are mobile and wages tend to increase fast, which implies that
the wage in the first job is not a proper indicator for the present value of life-time
earnings (e.g. Eckstein and Wolpin, 1995). Therefore, we do not only model the
job search process until accepting the first job, but we also allow for on-the-job
search. Furthermore, we do not restrict the structural parameters describing the
job search environment to be similar for individuals looking for their first job and
for employed workers. This allows us to distinguish between the hypothesis that
high job mobility and increasing wages are the result of frictions on the labor
market as opposed to the hypothesis that this is the result of accumulating work
experience.
Using a structural model has several advantages when modelling the labor
market behavior of students. Within the structural model job search behavior,
labor marker transitions and wages are jointly determined, and thus the inter-
dependency between these variables can be studied. The structure of the model
provides a way to handle individuals that have not been unemployed between
leaving school and starting work. Since we allow for on-the-job search, our model
provides estimates of the returns to early work experience. Finally, by explicitly
modelling job search behavior, we obtain an estimate for the costs of job search.
In the empirical analyses we use data from an annual survey of young work-
ers who recently finished undergraduate education at a Dutch university. In the
Netherlands, it is unusual that after completing undergraduate education, people
continue with Ph.D. education. Our data describes individuals who graduated in
economics, business administration, Dutch law or psychology between 1995 and
2001. Since labor market conditions for these individuals differ, we estimate our
model separately for different majors. Our data are unique in a sense that they
are extensive on job search behavior, for example the data include the moment
at which individuals actually start looking for work and the number of job ap-
plications. Furthermore, the data are rich on individual characteristics. It should
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be stressed that it is not our intention to estimate returns to education or to
compare returns of the different studies. The latter would require an extended
model, which includes the selection process into these studies.
The Dutch economy experienced a period of relatively fast economic growth
at the end of the 1990s. This was characterized by improvements in labor mar-
ket conditions, i.e. labor force participation rates, worker mobility, number of
vacancies, and real wages increased. After 2000 the growth of the Dutch economy
slowed down and the economy entered a period of recession. We investigate to
what extent labor market prospects of students change as a result of macroe-
conomic changes. In particular, we allow the structural parameters to depend
on business cycle indicators to investigate how labor market conditions affect
the behavior of individuals. The effect of business cycle variation on individual
search effort in our model is ambiguous, the direction depends on the values of
the structural elements in the model (see also Shimer, 2004).
The estimation results allow us to compute how labor market prospects vary
over the business cycle. Furthermore, we use the estimates to investigate the
importance of the returns to early work experience and how these change over
the business cycle. Wages increase not only due to real returns to work experience,
but also labor market frictions cause increasing wage profiles. Therefore, studying
wage accumulation over time does not provide a good measure for the returns to
work experience. If there would not be any returns to work experience individuals
change behavior, for example by setting a higher reservation wage for their first
job. Our structural model allows to disentangle between the effect of labor market
frictions on wages and early work experience, as well as it can deal with changes
in individual behavior. Therefore, in this case the structural model provides ideal
counterfactuals.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides some institutional
background on the Dutch educational system and business cycle variation during
the observation period. In Section 3 we present the structural model. The data
are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5 we provide some details on the estimation
of our structural model. Section 6 presents the estimation results of the structural
model and analysis on the returns to early work experience. Section 7 concludes.
2 Educational system in the Netherlands
In this section we briefly discuss the university education system in the Nether-
lands. We mainly focus on elements that are relevant for the individuals studied
in this paper. As mentioned in the introduction we only consider students, who
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finished undergraduate education with a major in economics, business adminis-
tration, Dutch law or psychology.
All universities in the Netherlands are public and tuition fees for undergrad-
uate students are low. The tuition fee is set by the government and does not
vary by field of study or by university attended. Annual tuition fees for full-time
students (under age 30) increased from around 800 euro in the early 1990s to
around 1250 euro at the end of the 1990s. Undergraduate students are entitled
to a uniform financial aid system. The grant depends on parental income and
whether or not students live at their parents’ house (see Leuven, Oosterbeek and
Van der Klaauw, 2003, for a more extensive discussion). During the 1990s a num-
ber of changes occurred. First, a larger share of the grant was made dependent
on parental income. In nominal terms the grant for students with low-earning
parents remained between 300 euro and 350 euro monthly (dependent on living
at the parents’ house) during the 1990s, for students with high-earning parents
nominal grants decreased more than 50 percent during the 1990s. Second, stu-
dents with low-earning parents got access to a loan with a maximum of 150 euro
in the early 1990s and over 400 euro at the end of the 1990s. Students typically
use the grants, but are very reluctant to take up the loan. Third, the duration
of entitlement to grants decreased. Students who started university education
before 1990 received grants for a maximum of 6 years, from 1991 until 1995 the
entitlement period was 5 years and in 1996 it was reduced to a maximum of 4
years.1
Undergraduate education is accessible for students who graduated from pre-
university track in secondary education and for students from higher vocational
education. Universities are not permitted to select students, every student sat-
isfying the entry requirements should be admitted. Traditionally most students
entered university after pre-university track in secondary education. However,
during the 1990s entry through higher vocational education became more popu-
lar. This is particularly true for economics and business administration where in
2002 around 45 percent of the students entered through higher vocational educa-
tion compared to only 25 percent in 1992. For Dutch law and psychology these
percentages are much lower.
Only a limited number of universities provide undergraduate studies with a
major in economics, business administration, Dutch law or psychology. Currently
6 Dutch universities offer undergraduate programs in economics and business ad-
ministration, 9 offer an undergraduate in law and 10 offer an undergraduate in
1During the 1990s the government also introduced a system where grants became loans if
students did not pass a minimum number of courses in each year (see Leuven, Oosterbeek and
Van der Klaauw, 2003). After its introduction this system has been modified a few times.
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psychology. At all universities the nominal duration of an undergraduate study
in economics, business administration, Dutch law and psychology is 4 years (al-
though most students do not actually graduate within this period). Students who
enter university education through higher vocational education might get dispen-
sation for classes, which they completed before. In the Netherlands a major is
a specialization, students take almost 90 percent of their courses within their
chosen major.2 Therefore, undergraduate education is often the final stage of an
individual’s education. In the Netherlands annually around 200 Ph.D. students
graduate in economics, business administration, law and psychology together,
which is about 2.5 percent of the total number of graduates from undergraduate
education in these fields. Even though undergraduate programs offered by dif-
ferent universities differ somewhat, they are considered to be close substitutes.
They attract students from the same pool of potential students and they pre-
pare students for the same labor market. Oosterbeek, Groot and Hartog (1992)
compare the labor market outcomes of graduates from the different economics de-
partments in the Netherlands and find that selection corrected wage differentials
are modest.
Figure 1 presents total enrollment at Dutch universities during the period
1992 until 2002. From 1992 until 1998 the total number of students registered
at a university decreased from around 187.500 to slightly over 160.000. After
1998 the number of students increased again to the level at the beginning of the
1990s. In Figure 2 we present first-year enrollment and the number of students
finishing undergraduate education from 1992 to 2002. The number of graduates
shows a peak in 1995/1996, probably due to the fact that the 1990/1991 cohort
of students received grants for 6 years and the 1991/1992 cohort for 5 years. The
pattern in first-year enrollment follows that of total enrollment closely. At the
beginning of the 1990s the size of the relevant birth cohort decreased. In 1992
around 14 percent of the individuals between 18 and 23 years old were enrolled in
a university. In 1997 this was 15 percent and it increased further to 17 percent in
2002. The latter can be explained from the increased popularity among graduates
from higher vocational education to continue with university education.
Trends in graduation, first-year and total enrollment in economics, business
administration, Dutch law and psychology follow the general trends closely. The
2Usually, students finish their undergraduate study with writing a short thesis (and maybe
completing some final courses). Students can graduate each month, but most students graduate
in August (slightly over 40 percent in our sample). There are some financial incentives not to
postpone graduation, if a student graduates before the end of the academic year the students
does not have to pay part of the tuition fee and after graduation an individual is entitled to
receiving welfare benefits which are higher than the government grants.
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only exception is that for economics the increase in (first-year) enrollment at the
end of the 1990s is somewhat larger than the general trend. Again this is caused
by the fact that economics is particularly popular among graduates from higher
vocational school.
During the end of the 1990s the Dutch economy experienced a period of
relatively large economic growth. Figure 3 provides the change in GDP during our
observation period and Figure 4 shows the unemployment rate. The year 2000 can
be considered as the top of the business cycle. From 1994 until 2000 the growth
rate of GDP was increasing and the unemployment rate was decreasing. After
2000 growth in GDP started to decline and at the end of 2001 the unemployment
rate started to increase.
3 The model
In this section we present the model that we use to describe the transition from
college to work. The model is a discrete-time job search model with endogenous
search effort and on-the-job search. Burdett (1978) first derived a job search
model that allowed for on-the-job search and Mortensen (1977) explicitly mod-
elled search effort as an individual decision variable. Even though for an individual
the structural parameters are constant over time, the model will be non station-
ary. This is caused by the fact that individuals can start searching for work before
they graduate, but they (usually) do not start working in a regular job before the
actual date of graduation. The model imposes that individuals choose their level
of job search effort and reservation wage path to optimize their present value
of future earnings. First, we consider the job search process before graduation.
Next, we discuss the job search process after the moment of graduating including
on-the-job search performed by employed workers.
3.1 The search process before graduation
Consider a student τ periods before graduation. The student can be in two pos-
sible states, actively searching for work or not searching for work. A student who
is searching for work has to decide at the beginning of each period τ how much
effort sτ ≥ 0 to devote to job search. There are two types of costs associated to
job search effort. First, fixed costs c0 made only once at the moment the student
starts searching for work actively.3 These fixed costs include for example writing a
vitae and a draft of an application letter, registering at public employment offices
3Yoon (1981) assumes that a job searcher make some fixed costs in every period.
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and private matching agencies, etc. Second, there are some variable costs, denoted
by cu(sτ ), depending on the amount of job search effort, which involve checking
newspapers for job advertisements, sending out applications, etc. A student who
is not searching does not have these variable costs, i.e. cu(0) = 0. The costs of de-
voting job search effort are increasing in the amount of effort, c′u(sτ ) > 0, and we
assume c′′u(sτ ) > 0 (Mortensen, 1986; and Stern, 1989; make similar assumptions
to guarantee the existence of a reservation wage).
A student who devotes τ periods before graduation effort sτ to job search,
receives a job offer in this period with probability 0 ≤ λu(sτ ) ≤ 1. Students who
do not devote any effort to job search cannot receive job offers, i.e. λu(0) = 0.
Increasing the amount of job search effort increases the probability of receiving
a job offer, λ′u(sτ ) > 0, but the returns to job search effort diminish λ
′′
u(sτ ) <
0. A job offer is characterized by its wage w, which is a realization from the
(continuous) wage offer distribution function Fu(w) (with finite mean, EFu(w) <
∞). At the moment a job is offered, the student has to decide immediately to
accept the job or to reject it and continue searching. We exclude the possibility
to reconsider job offers at a later stage. Once the student decides to accept a job
offer, he starts working in the new job immediately after graduating. We do not
consider the possibility that a student already starts working before graduation.
Neither do we allow for the possibility of continuing searching for a better job
after a job has been accepted. This assumption simplifies the analysis. The main
motivation for imposing the assumption is that a student, who already accepted
a job and continues searching for work, is less credible for other employers.
Individuals have an infinite horizon and they know the values of λu(·), c0,
cu(·), and the distribution function Fu(·). However, they do not know in advance
when job offers arrive and what the associated wages are. We assume that stu-
dents maximize their expected present value of future income. Future income is
discounted at the subjective rate ρ > 0. For a student who is actually search-
ing for work τ periods before graduation, we define Ru,τ as the present value of
search. The Bellman’s equation for the student satisfies
Ru,τ = max
st;t=0,...,τ
{
−
cu(sτ )
1 + ρ
+
λu(sτ )
1 + ρ
EFu
[
max
{
Re(W )
(1 + ρ)τ−1
, Ru,τ−1
}]
+
1− λu(sτ )
1 + ρ
Ru,τ−1
} (1)
where the wage W is a random variable that follows the distribution Fu(·) and
Re(w) is the value of working (after graduation) in a job with wage w. We de-
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rive Re(w) in the next subsection. For convenience we assume that the costs of
job search effort c(sτ ) are made at the end of each period. From the Bellman’s
equation it can be seen that if the student receives a job offer with associated
wage w in period τ , he accepts this job offer if the present value of accepting the
job Re(w)/(1 + ρ)
τ−1 exceeds the value of search Ru,τ−1. As will be shown later
Re(w) is an increasing function in w. Therefore, there exists some φτ for which
all job offers with wage w larger than φτ are acceptable to the student and job
offers with a wage w less than φτ are rejected. So φτ is the reservation wage of a
student τ periods before graduation, which is found by solving
Re(φτ)
(1 + ρ)τ−1
= Ru,τ−1
Substituting this reservation wage property into the Bellman’s equation gives the
condition for the optimal reservation wage path
Re(φτ+1) = max
st;t=0,...,τ
{
−cu(sτ )(1 + ρ)
τ−1 + λu(sτ )EFu [max {Re(W )− Re(φτ ), 0}]
+Re(φτ )}
(2)
Result 1 φτ ≥ φτ−k for all τ = 1, . . . and k = 1, . . . , τ . Before graduation the
reservation wage of a student φτ is non increasing as the moment of graduation
approaches.
Proof in Appendix A.
Next we determine the optimal amount of effort students devote to job search in
each period. Given the reservation wage φτ , the optimal search effort τ periods
before graduation is the search effort sτ that maximizes φτ+1. The first-order
condition for the optimal amount of job search effort is
c′u(sτ )
λ′u(sτ )
=
1
(1 + ρ)τ−1
∫ ∞
φτ
[Re(x)− Re(φτ )] dFu(x) (3)
The left-hand side of the first-order condition is positive, and it is increasing in
sτ (recall that c
′′
u(sτ ) > 0 and λ
′′
u(sτ ) < 0). A necessary condition for a student
to devote a positive amount of effort to job search τ periods before graduation is
thus that the reservation wage φτ should be such that
c′u(0)
λ′u(0)
<
1
(1 + ρ)τ−1
∫ ∞
φτ
[Re(x)− Re(φτ )] dFu(x)
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The right-hand side is positive and decreasing in φτ , while the left-hand side is
constant and positive. Let φ¯τ be the maximum value for which the inequality
still holds, which is decreasing in τ . Recall from Result 1 that the reservation
wage is non decreasing in τ . If in some period τ the reservation wage exceeds φ¯τ
the student does not devote any effort to job search in this period, nor has the
student devoted any effort to job search in the preceding periods.
Result 2 If sτ > 0, then sτ < sτ−k for all τ = 1, . . . and k = 1, . . . , τ . Students,
who have not accepted a job yet, increase their job search effort as the moment
of graduation gets closer.
Proof in Appendix A.
So far we focused on students who were already actively searching for work.
As mentioned above individuals have to make fixed costs c0 to start searching
for work. Consider a student who is not searching for work τ periods before
graduation. This individual decides to start searching for work in this period if
Ru,τ − c0 ≥ max
t=0,...,τ−1
{
Ru,t − c0
(1 + ρ)τ−t
}
If we substitute Ru,τ = Re(φτ+1)/(1 + ρ)
τ , this condition becomes
Re(φτ+1)− c0(1 + ρ)
τ ≥ max
t=0,...,τ−1
{
Re(φt+1)− c0(1 + ρ)
t
}
Using this inequality we can find the optimal moment τ0 for a student to start
searching for work actively. This moment τ0 satisfies
τ0 = arg max
τ=1,...
{
Re(φτ )− c0(1 + ρ)
τ−1
}
(4)
The function c0(1+ρ)
τ−1 is the present value at the moment of graduation of the
fixed search costs. It is increasing in τ , meaning that the earlier a student starts
searching for work, the higher the present value of the fixed search costs. Also
Re(φτ ) is an increasing function in τ , implying that also the payoffs of starting
with job search earlier are higher.
Result 3 τ0 is non decreasing if c0 decreases, i.e. lower fixed costs of starting job
search do not cause a student to start searching for work actively shorter before
the moment of graduation.
9
Proof in Appendix A.
A student does not start searching at all before graduation if the payoffs of job
search do not exceed the present value of the fixed costs, i.e. in each period
τ = 1, . . ., Re(φτ ) < c0(1 + ρ)
τ−1. Given that a student starts searching for work
before graduation, the moment at which the student starts is uniquely determined
by equation (4). The function Re(φτ )− c0(1 + ρ)
τ−1 has a single optimum.
Result 4 The moment τ0 at which a student starts searching for work is unique
or non-existing.
Proof in Appendix A.
To summarize the behavior of students, prior to period τ0, the student does
not devote any effort to job search and thus does not obtain any job offers.
After that the student starts searching with a relatively low job search effort,
but increases job search effort each period (until graduation or accepting work).
Since the student does not obtain job offers before τ0, the reservation wage is
not specified prior to τ0. At τ0 the reservation wage is relatively high. Towards
the moment of graduation the reservation wage is at least non increasing, but
typically decreasing.
For a student who has not accepted a job until the beginning of period τ , the
probability of accepting a job in period τ equals
θτ =
{
λu(sτ ) (1− Fu(φτ )) if τ ≤ τ0
0 if τ > τ0
Before τ0 students do not receive job offers and thus the probability of accepting
work equals 0. After τ0, the probability of accepting a job increases as the moment
of graduation approaches.
Result 5 θτ < θτ−k for all τ = 1, . . . , τ0 and k = 1, . . . , τ .
Proof in Appendix A.
3.2 The search process after graduation
Upon graduation an individual can either become unemployed or can start work-
ing. An individual starts working if the individual already accepted a job while
10
being student. Individuals can search for a new job when being employed and
make a job-to-job transition. We do not allow the possibility that employed work-
ers get fired from a job or that they quit working.4 Although employment is an
absorbing state, a job is not absorbing as there can be job-to-job transitions.
Individuals who become unemployed at graduation, either actively searched for
work while being student but did not succeed in finding work or did not start
searching for work yet. After the moment of graduation we can distinguish three
possible states, (1) the individual is unemployed and actively searching for work,
(2) the individual is unemployed and not actively searching for work, and (3) the
individual is employed.
Consider an individual who did not start working yet. This individual is en-
titled to collecting a particular type of welfare benefits, denoted by b. Welfare
benefits for school leavers are reduced benefits compared to those collected by
other welfare recipients, like job losers. The level of the benefits depends on the
housing situation. For most school leavers the level of the monthly gross welfare
benefits is about 435 euro. School leavers often qualify for substantial housing
subsidies, therefore we set the net monthly benefits level b equal to 450 euro.
These welfare benefits are paid for an unlimited period of time. After gradua-
tion the structural parameters, cu(s), λu(s), Fu(w) and ρ remain the same as
before graduation. Since the model is stationary (after graduation) unemployed
workers choose each period the same amount of job search effort s and the same
reservation wage φ. Let Ru be the value of search of an unemployed worker. The
Bellman’s equation for an unemployed individual equals
Ru = max
s≥0
{
b− cu(s)
1 + ρ
+
λu(s)
1 + ρ
EFu [max {Re(W ), Ru}] +
1− λu(s)
1 + ρ
Ru
}
From this equation it can be seen that welfare benefits b are paid at the end of
each period. The Bellman’s equation can be rewritten as
ρRu = b + max
s≥0
{−cu(s) + λu(s)EFu [max {Re(W )−Ru, 0}]}
If an unemployed worker receives a job offer with wage w, he accepts the offer if
Re(w) ≥ Ru. The reservation wage φ of the unemployed worker can be found by
solving
Re(φ) = Ru
4In our data set we hardly observe transitions from being employed to unemployment. Of
the individuals who were observed to have had at least 1 job, 99% is employed at the end of
our observation period.
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For a given value of φ, the optimal amount of job search effort s follows the
first-order condition
c′u(s)
λ′u(s)
=
∫ ∞
φ
(Re(w)−Re(φ)) dFu(w) (5)
The left-hand side of the first-order condition is positive, and it is increasing in
s. Therefore, a necessary condition for individuals to devote a positive amount of
effort to job search is that the reservation wage φ should be such that
c′u(0)
λ′u(0)
<
∫ ∞
φ
(Re(w)− Re(φ)) dFu(w)
As the right-hand side is positive and decreasing in φ, there exists some reserva-
tion wage φ¯ for which an unemployed worker does not devote any effort to job
search.
The framework we discussed so far is stationary, which means that as long as
an individual is unemployed, the individual has the same reservation wage and
devotes in every period the same amount of effort to job search. It also implies that
an individual who does not start searching for work immediately after graduating
will never devote any effort to job search and will never start working. This
latter contradicts our data as around 20 percent of the individuals has not yet
performed any job search activities 1 month after graduation. Almost 10 percent
of the individuals has not even started searching for work within 3 months after
graduation. These individuals derive for some period an instantaneous utility
from being unemployed which is much higher than the welfare benefits level, for
example because they planned a long holiday after graduation instead of going
to the labor market directly. For individuals who started only some months after
graduation, we assume that for a fixed period with length t0 immediately after
graduation their instantaneous utility of being unemployed equals b¯. The high
value of b¯ causes that φ > φ¯. The individual does not devote any effort to job
search t0−1 periods after graduation. For the same reason this individual also does
not search for work before graduation. In theory b¯ could be infinite, implying that
the individual definitely wants to be unemployed for t0 periods after graduation
and therefore would not want to run the risk of finding a job prior to the end of
this period. We assume that t0 and b¯ are known to the individual already before
graduation. Like students, who start searching for work, these individuals have
to make fixed search costs c0 at the moment they first start searching for work
(t0 − 1 periods after graduation).
Next, consider an employed individual receiving in each period wage w. While
being employed, workers can search for other jobs, but they cannot lose their job.
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The search process of employed workers is similar to that of students and unem-
ployed workers, but they face different structural parameters. The probability of
receiving a job offer equals λe(s) and wage offers are drawn from the wage offer
distribution Fe(w), which have the same properties as λu(s) and Fu(w) respec-
tively. For employed workers there are only the variable costs ce(s) of devoting
effort to job search, also ce(s) has the same properties as cu(s). As mentioned
earlier Re(w) is the value of work with wage w, which comes from the Bellman’s
equation
Re(w) = max
s≥0
{
w − ce(s)
1 + ρ
+
λe(s)
1 + ρ
EFe [max {Re(W ), Re(w)}] +
1− λe(s)
1 + ρ
Re(w)
}
(6)
The Bellman’s equation implies that wages are received at the end of a period.
The equation can be rewritten as
ρRe(w) = w + max
s≥0
{−ce(s) + λe(s)EFe [max {Re(W )− Re(w), 0}]} (7)
From the Bellman’s equation follows that Re(x) > Re(y) if x > y, the value of
work increases with the wage received by a worker. Therefore, employed workers
accept a job offer if the associated wage exceeds their current wage w. The optimal
amount of effort devoted to job search follows from the first-order condition
c′e(s)
λ′e(s)
=
∫ ∞
w
(Re(x)− Re(w)) dFe(x) (8)
Since the right-hand side is a decreasing function in w and the left-hand side is
an increasing function in s, the optimal amount of job search effort s is lower if
individuals receive higher wages w. Individuals only devote a positive amount of
effort to job search if
c′e(0)
λ′e(0)
<
∫ ∞
w
(Re(x)−Re(w)) dFe(x)
Since the left-hand side is positive and the right-hand side is decreasing in w,
there is some wage w¯ above which employed workers do not search for work
anymore.
Result 6 There exists a wage level w¯, for which s = 0 if w ≥ w¯. For w < w¯, s is
positive and decreasing in w. A worker reduces his job search effort if he receives
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a higher wage. If the wage exceeds a certain level, the worker does not devote any
effort to job search (see also Mortensen, 1986).5
Proof in Appendix A.
This result implies that above the wage level w¯, the value of working Re(w) equals
w/ρ. An individual who reaches a wage level above w¯, quits searching for work
and stays in this job forever.
3.3 Some remarks on the identification and parameteri-
zation
The unknown structural parameters of the model are the wage offer distributions
Fu(w) and Fe(w), the job offer arrival probabilities λu(s) and λe(s), the vari-
able costs function of job search cu(s) and ce(s), the initial costs of starting job
search c0, and the discount rate ρ. Before providing the parameterization of these
structural parameters we discuss their identification.
Let us for a moment assume that we observe the reservation wage path from
the moment an individual starts searching for work. In case we observe the exact
moment t at which the individual accepts a wage offer we can identify the wage
offer distribution above the reservation wage Fu(w|w > φt). It is well known from
Flinn and Heckman (1982) that the tail of the wage offer distribution below the
reservation wage cannot be identified without information on wages associated
to rejected job offers. Therefore, we cannot identify the wage offer distribution
below the lowest possible reservation wage, which is the reservation wage after
graduation. A similar identification problem arises for the wage offer distribution
of employed workers searching for a new job. An employed worker accepts a new
job if the wage offer w exceeds his current wage wc, so we can identify Fe(w|w >
wc). Again we cannot identify the wage offer distribution below the lowest possible
wage at which an individual is working, which is the earlier mentioned lowest
possible reservation wage. So we can only identify Fe(w) on the same support as
Fu(w). As will be mentioned below, to establish identification we assume that the
shape of the wage offer distribution is known up to an unknown set of parameters.
Before starting the first job, the probability of accepting a job equals λu(st)(1−
Fu(φt)). This hazard can be identified from the moment individuals start work-
ing. Without observing st, we can only identify the job offer arrival rate up to a
5Mortensen (1986) has a continuous-time framework and parameterizes the job offer arrival
rate as λs.
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normalization, as a high job offer arrival rate associated with a wage offer distri-
bution that has some mass below the reservation wage cannot be distinguished
from a low job offer arrival rate.
The costs function of job search effort is identified from observing job search
effort, wages, and reservation wages. Recall that the function for the optimal
amount of job search effort is given by equation (3) before graduation and equa-
tion (5) after graduation. These equations show that from observing job search
effort s we can identify the derivatives of the costs function of job search effort
c′u(s) and c
′
e(s). Since cu(0) = ce(0) = 0, we can actually identify for a given s
the costs function cu(s) as
∫ s
0
c′u(x)dx and ce(s) as
∫ s
0
c′e(x)dx.
The discount rate ρ is identified from the reservation wage path. In the dif-
ferential equation (2) describing the optimal reservation wage path all elements
except for ρ are identified or observed. So solving the optimal reservation wage
path identifies the discount rate ρ. However, estimation of ρ turned out to be
problematic even using simulated data. Therefore, we decided not to consider ρ
as a parameter to be estimated, but instead to fix its value to 0.20 annually. We
estimated models with other values for the discount rate, but 0.20 gave the best
fit.
The initial costs of job search c0 are identified from the moment a student
starts searching for work. Given that we do know all other structural parameters,
the value of c0 is given by equation (4), which ensures that c0 is identified.
So far, we have supposed that the complete reservation wage path of the un-
employed worker is observed. However, the data do not provide reservation wages.
Flinn and Heckman (1982) stress that if reservation wages are unobserved, similar
identification results can be derived. The identification hinges on the fact that
the minimum of the accepted wages equals the reservation wage at graduation.
Next we provide the parameterization of the structural parameters. We allow
the structural parameters to be dependent on individual characteristics. Let x
denote the vector of individual characteristics (including an intercept).
Both wage offer distributions follow a lognormal distribution function. The lo-
cation parameter is µ for students and unemployed workers and ψµµ for employed
workers. The scale parameters of the wage offer distribution is σ2 for students
and unemployed workers as well as for employed workers. The parameter ψµ can
be interpreted as the returns to early work experience. Furthermore, we let µ
depend on individual characteristics by µ = xβw.
The job offer arrival probability of unemployed workers and students follows
a transformed logit specification
λu(s) =
exp(λs)− 1
exp(λs)
s ≥ 0
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Obviously, this is an exponential distribution with intensity λ
λu(s) = 1− exp(−λs) s ≥ 0
This functional form ensures that the job offer probability equals 0 if an individual
does not devote any effort to job search (s = 0). The probability of receiving a
job offer increases in s, but the probability of receiving a job offer is restricted to
be less than 1. For employed workers we take the job offer probability equal to
λe(s) = 1− exp(−ψλλs) s ≥ 0
The parameter ψλ can be considered as a measure for labor market efficiency of
employed workers relative to unemployed workers and students. Finally, we allow
λ to be dependent on individual characteristics, i.e. λ = exp(xβλ).
The costs functions of job search for unemployed workers and students and
for employed workers follow
cu(s) = exp(cs)− 1 ce(s) = exp(ψccs)− 1 s ≥ 0
These costs functions equal 0 if an individual does not devote any effort to job
search and are increasing in s. We assume that the parameter c is similar for all
individuals. We do not parameterize the initial costs of job search c0 as this can
easily be estimated nonparametrically. We return to the issue in Subsection 5.1.
4 Data
Our data are from a survey of individuals who completed undergraduate educa-
tion in the Netherlands.6 The survey is a written questionnaire which contains
questions on education, job search behavior, work history and personal char-
acteristics. Each year in January or February individuals are interviewed who
graduated in the academic year two years earlier. For example the sample col-
lected in January 1999 contains individuals who graduated between September
1996 and August 1997. Individuals are interviewed only once and all information
is retrospective. The data contain 7 waves, starting in 1997 until 2003. Yearly
around 10,000 surveys are sent out and the response rate is between 40 and 45
percent.
From the waves we take all individuals who graduated in economics, business
administration, Dutch law and psychology. Since our model describes individuals
6For each study a random sample of graduates is selected from the administration of the
organization that coordinates enrollment of students at all Dutch universities and that makes
the payments of grants to students.
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who first enter the labor market, we exclude individuals who did part-time ed-
ucation, were over age 30 at the moment of graduation, and who were full-time
working before graduation. This results in a data set of 4505 individuals. Fur-
thermore, we exclude 36 individuals, who are unemployed at the moment of the
interview, never searched for work and report not to be interested in working,
and 107 individuals whose answers are inconsistent, for example the moment of
starting job search is later than the moment they started working or the second
job started before the first job. Next we exclude 398 individuals with item nonre-
sponse in the month of graduation or the moment of starting job search. Finally,
we exclude 430 individuals who started working freelance, in a family company
or their own company, became Ph.D. student or continued with another study. In
total the reduced data set includes 3534 individuals. Table 1 provides the sample
sizes stratified by study. Individuals within a particular major can be considered
as relatively homogeneous, but there is definitely serious heterogeneity between
the groups of students in different majors.
Let us first consider the individual’s situation at the moment of the interview.
An individual is considered to be employed if he has a job that contains at least 12
contractual working hours. For individuals with a major in economics, business
administration or Dutch law employment rates at the moment of the interview
are close to 1. For psychology graduates, employment rates at the moment of the
interview display an increasing trend over the observation period, from around
0.85 in 1997 to over 0.95 in 2002 and 2003. Conditional on being employed, almost
all individuals work full time, the average number of weekly contractual working
hours is between 38 and 40 for economics, business administration and Dutch
law graduates and about 34 for psychology graduates. For all groups there are
no trends over calendar time.
Table 2 provides the real net monthly wages paid at the moment of the survey.
These wages are measured in euro in February 1997 (the month of the first wave
of the survey). Wages of psychology graduates are typically lower than wages
for the other groups. The general picture is that there is an upward trend in
real wages (for all groups of graduates) until 2002 and a (small) drop in 2003.
This picture follows the general business cycle closely. Increasing wages can be
caused by less frictions in the labor market, i.e. individuals receive more job offers.
Therefore, we look at the percentage of individuals who switched jobs at least
once before the interview.7 This job turnover rate is highest among psychology
graduates, around 60 percent of the individuals had at least 2 jobs during the
observation period and it shows a slightly increasing trend. For all groups about
7In the questionnaire it is explicitly mentioned that individuals should consider job changes
within a firm as job-to-job transitions.
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40 to 45 percent of the individuals held more than 1 job. The data are not only
informative on the wage in the job at the moment of the interview, but also on
the wage in the first job after graduation. The real wage in this first job follows
the same pattern as the current real wage.
The survey asks individuals in which month they graduated and in which
month they started searching for work. There does not seem to be any trend
in the number of months that students start job search prior to graduation.
However, there are some differences between the groups of students. Around 75
percent of the economics and business administration graduates starts searching
for work before graduation and almost 60 percent started at least 3 months before
graduation. For Dutch law and psychology these percentages are lower, around
65 percent starts before graduation and slightly less than 50 percent started at
least 3 months before graduation.
We see a similar picture for the fraction of students that works immediately
upon graduation. There is no clear trend in this fraction within the different
groups of graduates, but there are some differences between the groups of grad-
uates. The ranking of the groups by the fraction of working immediately upon
graduation largely coincides with the ranking by the fraction that starts job
search early. In particular, around 43 percent of the economics and business ad-
ministration graduates already has work at the moment of graduation, while ap-
proximately 33 percent of the Dutch law and psychology graduates start working
immediately after graduating. Even though the fraction that works immediately
upon graduation is relatively constant over the years, there is in the earlier sur-
veys a downward trend in the fraction of individuals that is still unemployed 6
months after graduation.
The data contain information both about the number of job applications and
about the number of job interviews. In the first two surveys individuals were asked
about the total number of job applications and job interviews until the moment
the first job was accepted. Since 1999 individuals have to report the total number
of job applications and job interviews until the moment of the interview. In our
empirical analyses we use the number of job applications as a measure for job
search intensity. In Table 3 we present the average number of job applications
per group of graduates. For all groups, except for psychology graduates, we see
a downward trend in the number of job applications. In our empirical analyses
we do not use the number of job interviews, but it is interesting to look at job
interviews as these provides some insight in the tightness of the labor market.
The number of job interviews is relatively constant over time, which implies that
in the later years individuals needed less job applications to generate the same
number of job interviews. Psychology students need on average the most job
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applications for obtaining one job interview.
The variables discussed above are the endogenous variables in our structural
model. As mentioned in Subsection 3.3 we allow for observed heterogeneity in the
job offer arrival rate and the wage offer distribution. Since we will estimate the
model separately for each major, the samples are already relatively homogeneous.
Due to business cycle variation individuals who graduated in different years faced
different labor market conditions. To capture this business cycle variation we use
GDP growth and the unemployment rate. We also include a dummy variable for
being older than 25 years at the moment of graduation. If an individual is over
25 years old at the moment of graduation, this indicates that either the students
entered university via the higher vocational school track or stayed in university
for a long time. During our observation period there is a negative trend in the
average age at graduation. This negative trend coincides with the shortening
of the entitlement period of the government grants (see Section 2). There is
no indication that students stayed in university shorter as a consequence of the
improved labor market conditions in the later years of the observation period. We
include dummy variables for medium grades and for high grades in university. In
our sample approximately 53 percent has medium grades and 21 percent high
grades. In psychology the percentage of graduates with high grades is slightly
higher than in the other studies, but all percentages are constant over time. We
also have information on high school grades, but these are not informative in
addition to university grades.
About 53 percent of the individuals in our sample is man. There are large
variations between majors. In economics 75 percent of the graduates is man,
while in psychology this is only 17 percent. About 50 percent of the individuals
has a father with either a degree from higher vocational school or a degree from
university. This percentage is the same across studies and over time. And finally
we include the region at which an individual lives. We distinguish between living
in the west of the Netherlands or the rest of the Netherlands. The west area is
the most urbanized area containing the four largest cities in Holland. In this area
there are supposed to be more jobs available for university graduates and average
wages are also higher. In our sample 65 percent of the individuals live in the west,
while 55 percent of the individuals graduated from a university in the west.
5 Estimation of the structural model
In this section we discuss the estimation of the structural parameters λ, ψλ, µ,
ψµ, σ, c, ψc and c0.
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5.1 Preliminary issues
The key problem of estimating the model is that at any point in time the present
value of work Re(w) enters the decision problem of the individual (see Section 3).
Because the model does not provide a closed-form solution for Re(w), we need to
approximate Re(w).
Result 6 shows that there exists a wage level w¯ above which employed workers
do not search for work (se(w) = 0 for w ≥ w¯). This wage level follows from solving
c′e(0)
λ′e(0)
=
∫ ∞
w¯
(Re(x)− Re(w¯))dFe(x)
Because employed workers receiving wages w above w¯ stay in their job forever,
their present value of work Re(w) equals w/ρ. Furthermore, we have parameter-
ized c′e(0) = ψcc and λ
′
e(0) = ψλλ. Therefore, we can determine w¯ by solving the
condition
ρψcc
ψλλ
=
∫ ∞
w¯
(x− w¯)dFe(x)
Since Fe(w) is specified as a lognormal distribution function, the integral on the
right-hand side can be solved analytically.
Given that an employed worker earns a wage w less than w¯, the condition
for the optimal job search effort is given by equation (8). Solving this condition,
given our parameterization provides the optimal amount of job search effort
se(w) =
1
ψcc+ ψλλ
(
log
(
ψλλ
ψcc
)
+ log
(∫ ∞
w
(Re(x)−Re(w))dFe(x)
))
(9)
For employed workers who are actively searching for work, the present value
of work Re(w) does not equal w/ρ, but instead is given by equation (7). If we
substitute in this equation the condition for optimal job search effort and the
parameterization, we get
ρRe(w) = w− (exp(ψccse(w))− 1) + (1− exp(−ψλλse(w)))
ψcc exp(ψccse(w))
ψλλ exp(−ψλλse(w))
Note that Re(w) depends on se(w), which depends on Re(x) for all x ≥ w.
Therefore, we cannot obtain analytical solutions for se(w) and Re(w). We tried
to approximate Re(w) by different types of polynomials, but we could not find
any polynomial that had both an analytic solution for
∫ w¯
w
(Re(x)− Re(w)) dFe(x)
and a sufficiently good fit.8 Therefore, we choose a step-wise approximation for
Re(w).
8Bloemen (2004) approximates Re(x)−Re(w) by (x− w)/(ρ+ σ).
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Note that if w ≥ w¯, then se(w) = 0 and Re(w) = w/ρ. Since Fe(w) follows a
lognormal distribution function there is an analytic solution for
∫∞
w¯
(x−w¯)dFe(x).
Next, taking the first-difference with respect to w of both the left-hand side and
the right-hand side of equation (7) shows
∂Re(w)
∂w
=
1
ρ + λe(se(w)) (1− Fe(w))
For a small ∆ we can approximate
Re(w −∆) ≈ Re(w)−∆
∂Re(w)
∂w
and∫ ∞
w−∆
(Re(x)−Re(w −∆)) dFe(x) ≈
∫ ∞
w
(Re(x)−Re(w))dFe(x)
+ (Re(w)− Re(w −∆))
(
1− Fe(w) +
∆
2
fe(w)
)
and se(w − ∆) follows from substituting the approximation for this integral in
equation (9). So if we start from Re(w¯) = w¯/ρ, se(w¯) = 0 and the analytic
solution for
∫∞
w¯
Re(x) − Re(w¯)dFe(x), we can approximate Re(w) and se(w) by
the recursive formulas above. This approximation provides the behavior of the
individual when being employed. Next, we should determine the reservation wage
φ when being unemployed (after graduation) and the amount of search effort
su(φ).
Since we know Re(w) we can compute for each w
su(w) =
1
c+ λ
(
log
(
λ
c
)
+ log
(∫ ∞
w
(Re(x)− Re(w)) dFu(x)
))
So we can find φ by solving
ρRe(φ) = b− c(su(φ)) + λu(su(φ))
∫ ∞
φ
(Re(x)−Re(φ)) dFu(x)
The left-hand side is an increasing function in φ and the right-hand side is a
decreasing function in φ. The only numerical complication is that the integral on
the right-hand side is taken with respect to Fu(·) instead of Fe(·). Finally, we can
use equation (2) and equation (3) to determine the reservation wage path and
the amount of job search effort each period before graduation.
We assume that wages are observed with measurement error. Let w˜ denote the
observed wage and w is the true wage. These are related according to log(w˜) =
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log(w) + ε, where ε is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2ε . The
estimated variance of the measurement error can be interpreted as measure for the
goodness of fit of the model. The model describes the data well when, compared
to the sample variance in the observed logarithm of the wages, the variance in
the measurement error σ2ε is small.
Job search effort does not have a natural unit. Naturally, one interprets effort
as the number of hours spent searching for work. Our data are not informative
on the hours spent on job search, instead the data report the number of job
applications. Like Bloemen (2004) we use the number of job applications as a
measure for job search. Since making a job application does not always take the
same number of hours, we assume that the number of job applications measures
job search effort with an error. This measurement error has the same properties as
the measurement error for observed wages, it is normally distributed with mean
0 and variance σ2s .
5.2 Estimation
Our estimation procedure proceeds in three steps using conditional maximum
likelihood estimation. The main reason for adopting this three step procedure
instead of estimating all parameters jointly is the speed of the estimation proce-
dure. Joint estimation of all parameters implied a long time for each iteration and
very slow convergence. In the first step of our estimation procedure, we condition
on the optimal amount of job search effort and the optimal moment of starting
job search. As in this step we only use data on job search spells, employment
spells and wages, we can only estimate the parameters η = λ/c, ψη = ψλ/ψc,
µ, ψµ, σ, and σε. In the second step we use the observed amount of job search
effort to estimate λ, ψλ, c and ψc. And, in the third step we use the starting date
of job search to estimate c0. For the ease of presentation we suppress covariates.
Because we observe individuals from the start of their career, we do not face
initial conditions problems.
Step 1: estimation of η, ψη, µ, ψµ, σ, and σε In the ideal case, we observe
for each individual the job search duration before graduation, the period of being
unemployed, the wage in the first job, the length of the first job spell, the wage in
the second job, etc. Unfortunately, we do not observe exact job spells, instead we
observe the date at which an individual started working in the first job and in the
current job, the first wage and current wage, and whether an individual has had
one, two, or more jobs before the interview. So, the data are ideal for individuals
who had at most two jobs until the interview. But, for individuals who had more
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than two jobs, we lack information.9 To keep the likelihood function trackable,
we use for all individuals only information until accepting the second job. More
precisely, if an individual had more than two jobs, we use the wage in the first
job and the duration of the first job spell, i.e. the first job spell ended at least
before the current job started.
Likelihood contributions are most complicated for individuals who had two
jobs before the interview, other observations are special cases or involve only mi-
nor modifications. Therefore, we only discuss the likelihood contribution for an
individual with two jobs. Let τ0 denote the period that a student starts searching
for work previous to graduation and t0 denote the duration of the search period
until finding the first job, t1 is the length of the first job spell. For ease of exposi-
tion assume that the first job has been accepted after graduation (t0 > τ0).
10 In
the first job the observed wage equals w˜1 and in the second job w˜2.
The likelihood contribution equals
` =
(
τ0∏
τ=1
(1− θu,τ )
)
(1− θu,0)
t0−τ0−1θu,0
∫ w¯
φ
ϕ
(
log(w˜1)− log(w1)
σε
)
1
σεw˜1
(1− θe(w1))
t1−1θe(w1)
∫ ∞
w1
ϕ
(
log(w˜2)− log(w2)
σε
)
1
σεw˜2
ϕ
(
log(w2)−ψµµ
σ
)
1
σw2
1− Φ
(
log(w1)−ψµµ
σ
)dw2ϕ
(
log(w1)−µ
σ
)
1
σw1
1− Φ
(
log(φ)−µ
σ
) dw1
As the true wages in the first and the second job are not observed, the likelihood
contribution contains two integrals. The first integrates over all possible wages
in the first job, with the reservation wage φ (at the moment of accepting the
job) as lower bound and the maximum wage w¯ at which the individual continues
on-the-job search as upper bound. The second integral integrates over all possible
true wages in the second job, the true wage in the second job should exceed the
true wage in the first job. The second integral is the convolution of a lognormal
distribution and a truncated lognormal distribution function, which has a rela-
tively simple closed-form solution. The first integral does not have a closed-form
solution and therefore numerical integration is required. The absence of an ana-
lytical solution is due to the distribution of the duration of the (first) job spell,
(1− θe(w1))
t1−1θe(w1).
9Around 12 percent of the individuals had more than two jobs before the interview. This
percentage is highest among psychology graduates with almost 22 percent.
10If the individual started working immediately upon graduation, we summarize over the
possible time period in which the individual could have accepted the job.
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It is important to stress that the parameters λ and c only enter the likelihood
function as ratio of each other, i.e. if both λ and c are multiplied by some con-
stant, then φ, λu(su(φ)), and λe(se(w)) are unaffected. The same holds for ψλ
and ψc. This is well known in the literature and implies that based on data on
unemployment spells, employment spells and wages only the parameters η = λ/c
and ψη = ψλ/ψc can be identified.
Step 2: estimation of λ, ψλ, c, and ψc. In this step we use the observed
number of job applications s˜ and the estimates from the first step to disentangle λ
and c, and ψλ and ψc.
11 For ease of exposition we discuss the estimation procedure
for an individual who had only one job during the observation period, and found
this job after graduation. The likelihood contribution of this individual is given
by
`(s˜|τ0, t0, w˜1, t1) =
∫∞
φ
`(s˜|t1, w1, t2)`(w˜1|w1)`(w1)dw1∫∞
φ
`(w˜1|w1)`(w1)dw1
=
1∫∞
φ
ϕ
(
log(w˜1)−log(w1)
σˆε
)
1
σˆεw˜1
ϕ
(
log(w1)−µˆ
σˆ
)
1
σˆw1
dw1(∫ ∞
φ
ϕ
(
log (s˜)− log (
∑τ0
τ=1 su(φτ ) + (t0 − τ0)su(φ) + t1se(w1))
σs
)
1
σss˜
ϕ
(
log(w˜1)− log(w1)
σˆε
)
1
σˆεw˜1
ϕ
(
log(w1)− µˆ
σˆ
)
1
σˆw1
dw1
)
The amount of search effort before graduation su(φτ), while being unemployed
after graduation su(φ) and while being employed se(w1) are computed using the
recursive formulas discussed in Subsection 5.1. The integral in the denominator of
the first term has a closed-form solution, but the second integral does not have a
closed-form solution as it depends on the true amount of search effort. Therefore,
this term should be approximated numerically.
Similarly, we can derive the likelihood function of individuals, who never found
work and individuals who had two jobs before the moment of the interview. Com-
plications arise for individuals who had more than two jobs. For these individuals
we do not observe the exact number of jobs and thus also not the length of each
job spell. Therefore we ignore individuals who had more than two jobs. It should
be noted that this does not cause any selectivity problems, as in the first step we
have explicitly modeled the number of jobs of each individual.
11Recall from Section 4 that in the 1997 and 1998 surveys individuals were asked about the
number of job applications until accepting the first job and in the later surveys individuals had
to report all job applications until the moment of the interview.
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We optimize the loglikelihood function with respect to the parameters λ, c,
ψλ and ψc. The loglikelihood function depends on parameters that are estimated
in the first step, therefore we need to adjust the standard errors for λ, c, ψλ and
ψc. To correct the standard errors we use Theorem 6.1 of Newey and McFadden
(1994). We also estimate the covariance between the estimators in the second
step and in the first step. This is a straightforward extension from Newey and
McFadden (1994).
Step 3: estimation of c0 In this third step we use the observed month of
starting job search to estimate the fixed costs of starting job search c0. Result
3 states that the optimal moment of starting job search is a monotone function
of c0, in particular τ0 cannot decrease if c0 decreases. The optimal moment of
starting job search is given by equation (4). Given τ0 we can bound c0 by
1
ρ(1 + ρ)τ0
(Re(φτ0+2)− Re(φτ0+1)) ≤ c0 ≤
1
ρ(1 + ρ)τ0−1
(Re(φτ0+1)−Re(φτ0))
For all individuals who started searching for work before graduation, we can
compute both bounds for c0. Recall from Section (3) that individuals who did
not start searching for work before graduation receive utility from not working
immediately after graduation. This implies that the behavior of these individuals
is not informative about c0. Therefore, we ignore these individuals in this step
and estimate c0 only using individuals who started searching for work before
graduation. For each study we compute the density function for c0 and we use
kernel smoothing to obtain a relatively smooth density function for c0.
6 Results
In this section we discuss the estimation results of the structural model. First, we
provide the parameter estimates and discuss the fit of the model. Next, we focus
on the returns to work experience.
6.1 Parameter estimates
Students in different majors differ from each other and these differences are most
likely not fully captured by the observed individual characteristics included in
the model. Therefore, we will not focus on the returns to the different majors.
Individual characteristics are mainly used as control variables, without giving
strong causal interpretations to covariate effects. Table 4 provides the parameter
estimates of the structural model.
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The χ2-tests reported in Table 4 show that except for psychology graduates in-
dividual characteristics are important in explaining differences in job offer arrival
rates λ between individuals. For all groups individual characteristics are jointly
significant in the mean log wage offer µ. In many cases covariates have opposite
effects on the job offer arrival rate and the wage offer distribution. For example
individuals with low grades have higher job offer arrival probabilities (at a given
search effort) than individuals with high grades, who receive on average higher
wage offers. In most cases the impact on the wage offer distribution dominates in
explaining labor market prospects, i.e. at the moment of graduation individuals
with high grades have higher reservation wages than individuals with low grades.
The opposite impact of covariates on the job offer arrival rate and the wage offer
distribution can be explained from individual search behavior. Individuals with
high grades might be looking for other types of jobs than individuals with low
grades. Indeed individuals with high grades more often find a first job that re-
quires university education.12 These jobs pay higher wages, but are more difficult
to obtain. Furthermore, males and individuals whose father finished higher edu-
cation receive better wage offers and have lower job offer arrival rates than their
counterparts. For most groups labor market prospects are better in the west of
the Netherlands, which is in agreement with the empirical results of Bloemen
(2004).
Both the job offer arrival rate and the wage offer distribution can vary over
calendar time. In particular, we allow these structural parameters to depend on
the state of the business cycle at the moment of graduation.13 As indicators for
the business cycle we use GDP growth and the unemployment rate (see Figures
3 and 4). Because almost all individuals find their job in the time interval from 6
months prior to graduation until 6 months after graduation, we smooth the values
for GDP growth and the unemployment rate by taking their average values in
this time period. The correlation between the smoothed series of GDP growth
and the unemployment rate is −0.40. For all groups the unemployment rate is a
more important business cycle indicator than GDP growth. Mean wage offers are
significantly lower in periods when the unemployment rate is high. The impact
of the unemployment rate on the wage offer distribution does not differ much
12Our data contain some information on job characteristics, such as required level of education
and sector.
13Ideally, one would like the business cycle to have an ongoing effect on the job offer arrival
rate and the wage offer distribution. However, including such business cycle effects in the model
requires making assumptions about individuals’ predictions of the business cycle and to what
extent they are aware of uncertainty concerning economic conditions. In such a model not
only the current state of the business cycle is relevant, but also beliefs about future economic
conditions directly enter the Bellman’s equations described in Section 3.
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between groups, a 1 percent point increase in the unemployment rate lowers
mean real wage offers with approximately 3 percent. Recall that between the
mid-nineties and 2001 the unemployment rate dropped from around 7 percent to
2 percent, implying that real wage offers increased on average 15 percent. Only for
Dutch law and psychology graduates the business cycle has a significant impact
on the job offer arrival rate. A decrease in the unemployment rate increases the
probability of receiving a job offer (at a fixed search effort) and for Dutch law
graduates also an increase in GDP growth increases job offer arrival probabilities.
It is interesting to pay some attention to the question why the business cycle
affects the job offer arrival rate of psychology graduates more than the job offer
arrival rate of other groups. Recall from Section 4 that labor market outcomes
of psychology student are not as good as of the other groups, in particular two
years after graduation there is more unemployment among psychology graduates.
This suggests that the labor market for psychology graduates is less tight than
for the other groups. Finding work has not been the main problem for individuals
who graduated in economics, business administration and Dutch law. Therefore,
increased demand for skilled labor associated with the improved business cycle
conditions at the end of the nineties caused that employers had to raise wages
to attract employees. This is expressed in the increased fraction of individuals
who graduates in economics, business administration and Dutch law that finds a
first job which requires university education, i.e. this percentage increased from
around 60 at the beginning of the observation period until almost 70 in later years.
Psychology graduates had more difficulties finding work, so improvements in the
business cycle could actually make it more easy for them to find better paying
jobs. However, unlike for the other groups we do not see an increasing trend in the
percentage of psychology graduates that find a first job which requires university
education. This has been around 50 percent in all years of the observation period,
but in the later years they indicate that the content of the job connects well to
the study.
Shimer (2004) argues that individuals might lower their job search effort if
labor market conditions improve. In our model, the search environment is mainly
determined by the unemployment rate. In Figure 5 we show for all four groups
the average optimal amount of search effort (at the moment of graduation condi-
tional on being unemployed) as a function of the unemployment rate. Dutch law
graduates is the group which makes most job applications per month, on average
they write 2 application letters per month, while business administration gradu-
ates make only slightly more than 1 job application per month. Individuals devote
less effort to job search in periods with high unemployment, although the optimal
amount of job search effort does not seem to be very sensible to business cycle
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variation. This seems to contradict the theoretical predictions of Shimer (2004),
even though our population consists of high educated workers who face favorable
labor market conditions. However, Shimer (2004) considers a setting where the
business cycle only directly affects the job offer arrival rate. If in our model the
unemployment rate would only affect the job offer arrival rate, we would get as
predicted by Shimer (2004) that higher unemployment increases search effort. We
note that our estimated probabilities of receiving a job offer are much lower than
the values Shimer (2004) requires for obtaining his predictions.14
In Figures 6 and 7 we show for each group the estimated reservation wage at
the moment of graduation (φ) and the estimated lowest wage at which employed
workers do not devote any effort to on-the-job search (w¯). The reservation wage
at the moment of graduation is a measure for the labor market prospects of
students while the highest wage at which employed workers still search for work
reflects the opportunities for employed workers to find better paying jobs. We
find similar patterns for all groups, the reservation wages and the lowest wage
at which individuals stop searching follow the business cycle closely. Reservation
wages are highest for economics graduates and lowest for psychology graduates.
Individuals who graduated in business administration continue searching up to
a higher wage than the individuals in other groups. This is the result of the
relatively high value of the variance in the wage offer distribution σ2 for business
administration graduates.
For graduates in business administration job search while being unemployed
is most expensive. The variable costs of making one job application per month are
for these individuals almost 60 euro, while for the other groups the variable costs
are between 13 and 30 euro. Job search is much more expensive for employed
workers than for unemployed workers, the estimates for ψc are for all groups
significantly larger than 1. This coincides with the finding of Bloemen (2004)
and reflects that the value of leisure is higher for employed workers than for
unemployed workers. However, job applications of employed workers are more
likely to generate a job offer than job applications of unemployed workers, ψλ is
for all groups larger than 1 but only significantly for Dutch law and psychology
graduates. These individuals enter another labor market after accepting their first
job, i.e. more jobs become accessible. Bowlus, Kiefer and Neumann (2001) find
14On average the monthly probabilities of receiving a job offer (at the optimal job search
effort at the moment of graduation) do not vary much over calendar time for individuals who
graduated in economics, business administration and Dutch law, these probabilities are 0.44,
0.27 and 0.23 respectively. For psychology graduates there is an increasing trend during the
observation period in the probability of receiving a job offer. In the beginning of the observation
period this probability was 0.17 and it increased to 0.30 at the end of the observation period.
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that the probability of receiving a job offer is lower while being employed than
while being unemployed. Our results show that job search is actually more efficient
while being employed, but as search costs are higher employed workers devote less
effort to job search than unemployed workers or students and therefore receive
less job offers. For Dutch law and psychology graduates the wage offer distribution
does not vary significantly between unemployed and employed individuals. For
economics and business administration graduates there is a significant difference
in the wage offer distribution between employed and unemployed individuals.
Mean wage offers are higher while being employed, the difference is significant
but quantitatively not large. In the next section we return to the differences in
search environment between unemployed and employed individuals.
To get some insight in the performance of the model we report in Table 5 the
observed and predicted number of jobs until the survey date and the employment
rate at graduation. Both the predicted number of jobs and the employment rate
at the moment of graduation are close to their observed values in the data, which
indicates a good fit of the model. Also the estimated variance of the measure-
ment errors is a measure of fit of the model. The variance in the logarithm of
the observed real wages equals 0.0615, 0.0585, 0.0595 and 0.1203 for economics,
business administration, Dutch law and psychology graduates respectively. Com-
paring these to the estimated variances of the measurement errors σ2ε , indicates
that our model explains 47 percent of the variance in the logarithm of wages for
economics graduates, 65 percent for business administration graduates, 56 per-
cent for Dutch law graduates and 49 percent for psychology graduates. Given that
our populations are very homogenous these percentages are very high. This im-
plies that the first step of our estimation procedure did well, the model provides
a good fit of the wages and the unemployment and job durations.
In the second step of the estimation procedure we fit the number of job appli-
cations to the predicted search effort. The estimated variance of the measurement
errors is large compared to the variance in the observed number of job applica-
tions. This indicates that the fit in the second step is poor. In particular, our
model overestimates the number of job applications. An explanation that on av-
erage individuals apply less for work than predicted by our model is that many
individuals do not continue searching for work once they start their first job. In
the data 47 percent of the economics graduates did not continue searching on-
the-job after accepting the first job, and these percentages are 42, 40 and 21 for
business administration, Dutch law and psychology graduates respectively. Using
the model we can estimate the fraction of individuals that should search on-the-
job in the first job. Let φ be the reservation wage at the moment of accepting the
first job and w¯ is the wage at which individuals quit searching on-the-job, than
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the probability that an individual should continue searching after accepting the
first job is Fu(w ≤ w¯|w > φ), which is the probability that an acceptable wage
for the first job is less than w¯. According to our model for all groups at any point
in time more than 99 percent should search on-the-job in the first job.
There may be a number of reasons why individuals search less for work than
optimal. After accepting a job individuals may wait some period before they start
searching for a next job. There might be a negative stigma attached to quitting a
job soon after starting. Also there may be some fixed costs associated to starting
searching on-the-job. Or it might be the case that firms offer tenure profiles, i.e.
individuals know that if they stay in a job their wage will increase gradually over
time or that they will get promoted after some period. However, recall that if
someone changed job within firms, this should be registered as different jobs. We
performed a simple regression of whether individuals continued searching in the
first job on the characteristics of the first job. This shows that for all groups
the most important reasons not to continue searching are if university education
is required for the job and if the job offers a permanent contract. Psychology
graduates are also less likely to continue searching for work if the first job contains
more contractual hours and if they work for the government.
Figure 8 presents the non-parametric densities of the startup costs for the
different studies. In general, the estimated startup costs are very large for all
groups. These high search startup costs imply that the model has difficulties
explaining why individuals do not start searching for work early. Given that
labor market conditions are very favorable for university graduates, reasonable
startup costs imply that students should start searching for work much earlier
than observed in the data. A possible explanation that students wait relatively
long is that employers might be reluctant to hire a student a long period before
graduation. This would imply that the job offer arrival rate is not constant in the
period before graduation, but increasing as the moment of graduation approaches.
Since our data are not informative on the moment of accepting a job (before
graduation), we cannot identify such a non-stationary pattern in the job offer
arrival rate. An alternative explanation is that the time spend on searching for
work before graduation might be at the costs of study effort. In that case search
effort before graduation is more expensive than while being unemployed, but this
is again unidentified from the data.
Many students start searching for work relatively late and the majority of
the students becomes unemployed immediately after graduation. It is therefore
interesting to see to what extent the employment rate after graduation can be
reduced if students would start searching for work earlier. Let’s consider a pol-
icy that forces all students to start searching for work actively 6 months before
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graduation. Such a policy could for example consist of a mandatory course on
job search just before the final semester, in which students are assisted in making
their first job applications. If all students would actually start searching 6 months
prior to graduation, employment rates at graduation would be 65 percent for eco-
nomics graduates, 65 percent for business administration graduates, 62 percent
for Dutch law graduates and 64 percent for psychology graduates. These percent-
ages are remarkably close to each other. This implies that the main reason why
employment rates at the moment of graduation for Dutch law and psychology
graduates are lower than for economics and business administration graduates,
is that they start searching for work later and not that they face more difficul-
ties finding their first job. Furthermore, for all groups these employment rates
are much higher than the current employment rates (see Table 5), so stimulating
students to start searching for work earlier can be a useful policy for increasing
employment rates.
6.2 Returns to early work experience
Our model describes individuals who first enter the labor market and who do
not have any relevant work experience. In the beginning of a career wages rise
faster than at any other point during the life cycle.15 Topel and Ward (1992)
address that wages of young workers may increase with experience even if the
true effect of work experience on labor market outcomes is zero. Labor market
frictions cause that it takes some time before new entrants on the labor market
reach the steady state. Wage increases in the beginning of a career may thus as
well be the result of labor market frictions as of accumulated work experience.
In our model work experience is represented by the parameters ψλ and ψµ. If
these parameters equal 1, labor market conditions do not change after an indi-
vidual accepts his first job and all earnings increases are the consequence of labor
market frictions. Recall that for all groups there are significant returns to work
experience, for Dutch law and psychology graduates ψλ differs significantly from 1
and ψµ is significantly different from 1 for economics and business administration
graduates.
Substantial returns to work experience make the first job a stepping stone
towards better jobs. Therefore, individuals will be less selective on their first job,
i.e. reservation wages are lower while being a student or unemployed. Because
they also devote more effort to job search, transition rates to work increase and
employment rates just after graduation are higher. Returns to work experience
15See Figure 1 in Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2001), which shows that for all levels of
education individuals have sharp increases in earnings at the beginning of their career.
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have a direct impact on the labor market position after accepting the first job
and because individuals have been less selective on choosing their first job, the
transition rate out of the first job is higher as well as the expected wage increase
between the first and second job. Finally, w¯ is higher if there are returns to work
experience and thus the expected long-run wage EFe[W |W > w¯] will be higher.
We use these theoretical predictions to investigate the importance of the returns
to work experience.
For each group we simulate our model twice, first using the estimated pa-
rameters and second without true returns to work experience ψλ = ψµ = 1. In
the latter case all job-to-job transitions and wage increases are the consequence
of labor market frictions. In Figures 9 and 10 we show the expected employ-
ment rates and the average earnings for the two years following graduation.16
The difference between both lines in the figures is the result of true returns to
work experience. There are substantial differences in employment rates with and
without true returns to work experience and this difference already exists at the
moment of graduation. The existence of true returns to work experience causes
individuals to find their first job much faster. This is mainly the result of much
lower reservation wages in the presence of true returns to work experience. There
is also a substantial difference in average earnings with and without true returns
to work experience, i.e. average earnings are lower if ψλ = ψµ = 1. This difference
in earnings in the period just after graduation should be attributed to differences
in employment rates, as the average wage in the first job is much lower in case
there are true returns to work experience (see Table 7). Furthermore, from Table
7 we see if there would be no returns to work experience the fraction of individu-
als that moves to a new job within a year after accepting the first job is reduced
enormously. This reduction in job turnover is the consequence of reduced search
effort while being employed due to high costs of on-the-job search. Also the wage
increase associated to the move from the first to the second job is much lower if
there are no returns to work experience. But this is partly the result of the lower
average wages in the first job.
From the simulation experiments we conclude that true returns to work ex-
perience have a large impact on labor market outcomes. But in case there are
no true returns to work experience, labor market frictions cause that earnings
increase over time and individuals switch jobs and experience wage growth. The
impact of labor market frictions on average labor market outcomes of a group
becomes less if the duration since graduation increases, as individuals reach the
steady state of the labor market. Therefore, particularly in the beginning of the
16In case an individual is unemployed his monthly earnings equal the welfare benefits of 450
euro per month.
32
life cycle changes in average earnings increases should not all be attributed to
accumulated work experience as is commonly done in Mincer earnings equations.
In the easiest specification the Mincer earnings equation predicts that over
the life-cycle expected earnings depend on schooling and work experience in the
following way
E[log(w)] = γ0 + γ1s+ γ2e + γ3e
2
where s denotes years of schooling and e is the years of work experience. Since
our sample contains only individuals who finished undergraduate education, s is
the same for each individual. This implies that we can estimate γ2 and γ3 by
γ2 =
4E[log(w)|e = 1]− E[log(w)|e = 2]− 3E[log(w)|e = 0]
2
and
γ3 =
E[log(w)|e = 2]− 2E[log(w)|e = 1] + E[log(w)|e = 0]
2
Using our estimated structural model we can compute for each group of graduates
the expected earnings E[log(w)|e = 0], E[log(w)|e = 1] and E[log(w)|e = 2]. If
we set ψλ = ψµ = 1, then there are no true returns to work experience. However
as can be seen from Table 7 in this case γ2 and γ3 are not estimated equal to 0.
Furthermore, in Table 7 we give the estimates for γ2 and γ3 in case ψλ and ψµ
equal their estimated value. The sum of the two parameters equals the increase
of log earnings in the first year and γ2 + 3γ3 the increase in average log earnings
in the second year.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we developed a model that describes labor market behavior of indi-
viduals around graduation. We explicitly modelled job search effort and allowed
for on-the-job search. Students usually do not start working before graduating,
but start searching for work prior to graduation. Therefore, our model is non
stationary even if all structural parameters are stationary. In particular, some
period before graduation students start searching for work with a low intensity
and high reservation wages. As the moment of graduation approaches (and they
have not found a job yet), students increase their job search effort and lower their
reservation wage. This model is capable of explaining the common finding that a
large share of students starts working immediately after graduating.
In the structural empirical analyses we have used different groups of university
graduates in the Netherlands. The data describe a relatively long observation
period, which allows to investigate the importance of business cycle variation on
33
labor market prospects. The empirical results indicate that the business cycle is
important, in particular the unemployment rate around graduation affects the
wage offer distribution. If the unemployment rate decreases with 1 percent point,
median wage offers increase with 3 percent.
The model provides a good fit on observed wages and transitions, but a rel-
atively poor fit on job search effort. In particular, our model over predicts indi-
vidual search effort. Contrary to our model predictions many individuals do not
search on-the-job in their first job. Furthermore, individuals tend to start search-
ing for work only a short period before graduation. Policy simulations show that
employment rates at the moment of graduation could be increased from around
40 percent to 65 percent if all individuals would start job search 6 months before
graduation.
Our results indicate that there are substantial returns to work experience.
The existence of these returns to work experience have particularly large effects
on employment rates just after graduation. Because the first job is a stepping
stone towards better jobs, individuals are less selective on choosing the first job.
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Appendix A: Proofs of the results
Result 1 φτ ≥ φτ−k for all τ = 1, . . . and k = 1, . . . , τ . Before graduation the reserva-
tion wage of a student φτ is non increasing as the moment of graduation approaches.
Proof of Result 1: Rewrite equation (2) as
Re(φτ+1)−Re(φτ ) = max
st;t=0,...,τ
{
−cu(sτ )(1 + ρ)
τ−1
+λu(sτ )EFu [max {Re(W )−Re(φτ ), 0}]}
Because cu(0) = 0 and λu(0) = 0, the right-hand side of the equation should be
non-negative, which means Re(φτ+1) ≥ Re(φτ ). Re(·) is an increasing function in its
argument, which implies φτ+1 ≥ φτ . 
Result 2 If sτ > 0, then sτ < sτ−k for all τ = 1, . . . and k = 1, . . . , τ . Students, who
have not accepted a job yet, increase their job search effort as the moment of graduation
gets closer.
Proof of Result 2: Recall that φτ ≥ φτ−1. As mentioned above
∫∞
φ
[Re(x)−Re(φ)] dF (x)
is decreasing in φ, which means∫ ∞
φτ
[Re(x)−Re(φτ )] dFu(x) ≤
∫ ∞
φτ−1
[Re(x)−Re(φτ−1)] dFu(x)
Since 1/(1 + ρ)τ < 1/(1 + ρ)τ−1, also
c′u(sτ )
λ′u(sτ )
<
c′u(sτ−1)
λ′u(sτ−1)
Because c′u(s)/λ
′
u(s) is an increasing function in s, the inequality implies sτ < sτ−1. 
Result 3 τ0 is non decreasing if c0 decreases, i.e. lower fixed costs of starting job
search do not cause a student to start searching for work actively shorter before the
moment of graduation.
Proof of Result 3: Consider the case where the fixed costs of starting job search
change from c0 to c
′
0 < c0. Changing the fixed costs does not affect Re(φτ ). Therefore,
we can rewrite
Re(φτ )− c
′
0(1 + ρ)
τ−1 = Re(φτ )− c0(1 + ρ)
τ−1 − (c′0 − c0)(1 + ρ)
τ−1
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Since for any moment τ < τ0
Re(φτ0)− c0(1 + ρ)
τ0−1 > Re(φτ )− c0(1 + ρ)
τ−1
we can show that
Re(φτ0)− c
′
0(1 + ρ)
τ0−1 = Re(φτ0)− c0(1 + ρ)
τ0−1 − (c′0 − c0)(1 + ρ)
τ0−1
> Re(φτ )− c0(1 + ρ)
τ−1 − (c′0 − c0)(1 + ρ)
τ0−1
> Re(φτ )− c0(1 + ρ)
τ−1 − (c′0 − c0)(1 + ρ)
τ−1
= Re(φτ )− c
′
0(1 + ρ)
τ−1
And thus
arg max
τ=1,...
{
Re(φτ )− c
′
0(1 + ρ)
τ−1
}
≥ τ0

Result 4 The moment τ0 at which a student starts searching for work is unique or
non-existing.
Proof of Result 4: Note that
Re(φτ+1)−Re(φτ ) = max
st;t=1,...,τ
{
−cu(sτ )(1 + ρ)
τ−1
+λu(sτ )EFu [max {Re(W )−Re(φτ ), 0}]}
= (1 + ρ)τ−1
{
λu(sτ )
c′u(sτ )
λ′u(sτ )
− cu(sτ )
}
where in the last line sτ is the optimal amount of job search effort in period τ . The
right-hand side is strictly positive. The first term (1 + ρ)τ−1 is increasing in τ , but the
second term is decreasing in τ , as we know that the term increases in sτ and sτ+1 < sτ .
Next note that
c0(1 + ρ)
τ − c0(1 + ρ)
τ−1 = ρc0(1 + ρ)
τ−1
which also increases in τ . Comparing these equations proves that as long as
λu(sτ )
c′u(sτ )
λ′u(sτ )
− c(sτ ) > ρc0
Re(φτ )− c0(1+ρ)
τ−1 increases in τ , otherwise it is decreasing. Since the left-hand side
decreases in τ and the right-hand side does not depend on τ , there exists a unique τ0.
However, if at the optimal moment of starting job search the returns to job search
are lower than the present value of the fixed search costs, Re(φτ0) < c0(1 + ρ)
τ0−1, the
student will not start searching at all before graduation. In this case τ0 is non-existing.

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Result 5 θτ < θτ−k for all τ = 1, . . . , τ0 and k = 1, . . . , τ .
Proof of Result 5: Recall that sτ is decreasing in τ and φτ is non decreasing in τ . Since
λu(sτ ) is an increasing function in sτ , it is decreasing in τ . Furthermore, (1− Fu(φτ ))
is decreasing in φτ and thus it is decreasing τ . As a result θτ is decreasing in τ . 
Result 6 There exists a wage level w¯, for which s = 0 if w ≥ w¯. For w < w¯, s is
positive and decreasing in w. A worker reduces his job search effort if he receives a
higher wage. If the wage exceeds a certain level, the worker does not devote any effort
to job search.
Proof of Result 6: Consider the condition for devoting a positive amount of effort to
job search
c′e(0)
λ′e(0)
<
∫ ∞
w
[Re(x)−Re(w)] dFe(x)
The left-hand side of the equation is positive. The right-hand side is also positive.
To show that there exists some w¯ above which individuals stop devoting effort to job
search, we have to show that the right-hand side is decreasing in w and becomes 0 if
w approaches infinity. The derivative of the right-hand side with respect to w equals
−
∂Re(w)
∂w
(1− Fe(w))
which is negative, because Re(w) is an increasing function in w. Next we show that if
w approaches infinity the right-hand side of the condition for positive job search effort
becomes 0. Note that Re(x)−Re(w) ≤ x−w for x ≥ w. This means∫ ∞
w
[Re(x)−Re(w)] dFe(x) ≤
∫ ∞
w
(x− w)dFe(x) = EFe [W ]−
∫ w
0
(1− Fe(x))dx
The wage offer distribution Fe(·) has a finite mean and
lim
w→∞
∫ w
0
(1− Fe(x))dx = EFe [W ]
Therefore
lim
w→∞
∫ ∞
w
[Re(x)−Re(w)] dFe(x) = 0
Next, we already have seen that c
′
e(s)
λ′e(s)
is an increasing function in s. Since
∫∞
w
Re(x)−
Re(w)dFe(x) decreases in w, search effort decreases in w for w < w¯. 
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Total
Economics 1288
Business (Administration) 741
Dutch Law 875
Psychology 630
Total 3534
Table 1: Sample size stratified by study.
Year of interview
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Economics 1301 1321 1337 1435 1426 1544 1392
Business 1345 1317 1387 1440 1422 1500 1449
Dutch Law 1274 1243 1279 1359 1402 1500 1356
Psychology 1102 1081 1200 1196 1173 1219 1220
Table 2: The average real monthly net wage of employed individuals at the mo-
ment of the questionnaire (in euros in February 1997).
Year of interview
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Economics 13.4 12.1 11.6 7.8 5.2 4.7 5.6
Business 9.5 11.8 11.1 8.4 6.0 7.5 9.0
Dutch law 16.8 16.6 15.6 9.8 7.3 5.1 7.0
Psychology 13.3 17.5 14.3 9.9 15.1 13.1 11.0
Explanatory note: In the 1997 and 1998 surveys individuals were asked to report the number
of job applications until accepting the first job. Since 1999 individuals have to report the total
number of job applications until the moment of the survey.
Table 3: Number of job applications.
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Economics Business Dutch law Psychology
Job offer arrival rate λ
Intercept −0.774 −1.283 −1.749 −1.150
(0.347) (0.191) (0.178) (0.245)
Individual characteristics
Average level of grades in study
Medium grades −0.312 0.068 −0.118 −0.185
(0.062) (0.079) (0.081) (0.113)
High grades −0.172 0.030 −0.099 −0.148
(0.086) (0.101) (0.100) (0.139)
Male −0.210 −0.317 −0.113 −0.141
(0.066) (0.070) (0.078) (0.109)
Higher education farther −0.121 −0.109 −0.126 −0.096
(0.056) (0.072) (0.073) (0.101)
Older than 25 years −0.102 −0.021 −0.229 −0.030
(0.065) (0.070) (0.079) (0.110)
West 0.122 −0.133 0.070 0.114
(0.058) (0.074) (0.075) (0.104)
χ2-tests for joint significance 44.6 38.5 15.3 6.9
Business cycle variation
GDP growth 0.002 0.039 0.032 0.006
(0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.023)
Unemployment rate 0.031 0.012 −0.020 −0.127
(0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.032)
χ2-tests for joint significance 3.2 5.0 6.5 18.7
Table 4: Results of the structural model.
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Economics Business Dutch law Psychology
Mean log earnings level µ
Intercept 7.115 7.130 7.199 7.272
(0.059) (0.042) (0.034) (0.047)
Individual characteristics
Average level of grades in study
Medium grades 0.064 0.048 0.033 0.026
(0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.024)
High grades 0.092 0.062 0.029 0.052
(0.016) (0.023) (0.023) (0.032)
Male 0.045 0.073 0.001 0.018
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020)
Higher education farther 0.043 0.001 0.057 0.050
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020)
Older than 25 years 0.031 0.006 0.045 −0.026
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.021)
West 0.017 0.068 0.053 −0.058
(0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.022)
χ2-tests for joint significance 73.3 55.4 48.1 16.1
Business cycle variation
GDP growth 0.001 −0.003 −0.005 −0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Unemployment rate −0.032 −0.026 −0.033 −0.028
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
χ2-tests for joint significance 96.1 41.0 54.2 20.6
Table 4: (Continued).
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Additional parameters
c 3.362 4.044 2.630 2.957
(0.112) (0.191) (0.104) (0.140)
ψλ 2.515 2.530 9.297 6.182
(1.993) (1.424) (3.272) (0.934)
ψµ 1.009 1.009 0.998 0.995
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
ψc 11.282 6.847 12.082 5.506
(1.880) (1.114) (3.074) (0.873)
σ 0.168 0.180 0.158 0.151
(0.022) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017)
σε 0.180 0.144 0.162 0.248
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.013)
σs 0.950 0.978 1.046 0.932
(0.017) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022)
Table 4: (Continued).
Economics Business Dutch law Psychology
pred. obs. pred. obs. pred. obs. pred. obs.
Number of jobs at survey date
No jobs 1.0 0.3 1.1 0.1 2.3 0.7 3.8 2.4
1 job 60.3 62.5 52.7 55.3 49.1 53.5 43.5 39.2
2 jobs 32.2 28.4 37.0 34.7 36.1 30.7 35.7 36.5
3 or more jobs 6.5 8.7 9.2 9.9 12.5 15.1 17.0 21.9
Employed rate at graduation 44.2 44.3 41.2 42.6 33.9 32.5 33.8 34.6
Table 5: Observed and predicted distribution of number of jobs at moment of
survey and employment rate at graduation.
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True returns to work experience
Yes No
Average wage in first job
Economics 1342.1 1544.4
Business 1318.3 1523.5
Dutch law 1268.9 1548.5
Psychology 1278.2 1443.3
Fraction changing jobs within year after accepting first job
Economics 0.34 0.02
Business 0.40 0.05
Dutch law 0.47 0.01
Psychology 0.53 0.07
Average wage increase between first and second job
Economics 172.7 117.5
Business 225.9 147.5
Dutch law 165.8 116.1
Psychology 155.4 127.6
Table 6: Results from simulation experiments on the importance on true returns
to work experience.
Economics Business Dutch Law Psychology
Mincer earnings regression with ψλ = ψµ = 1
γ2 0.4206 0.4439 0.3549 0.5227
γ3 −0.0555 −0.0649 −0.0388 −0.0897
With true returns to work experience
γ2 0.7505 0.5761 0.7109 0.6508
γ3 −0.1939 −0.1150 −0.1649 −0.1384
Table 7: Results of the simulations with the Mincer equation.
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Figure 1: The total number of students (× 1000) registered at Dutch universities
(source: Statistics Netherlands).
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Figure 2: The number of students (× 1000) enrolling in the first year and gradu-
ating (source: Statistics Netherlands).
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Figure 3: Economic growth measured in percentage increases in GDP (source:
Statistics Netherlands).
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Figure 4: The unemployment rate (in percentage) (source: Statistics Netherlands).
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Figure 5: Optimal monthly job search effort (measured in job applications) at the
moment of graduation as function of the unemployment rate.
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Figure 6: Changes in the reservation wage (φ) at the moment of graduation over
calendar time.
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Figure 7: Changes in lowest wage at which individuals do not search on-the-job
(w¯) over calendar time.
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Figure 8: Non-parametric density estimations of the search start-up costs.
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Figure 9: Simulated employment rates two years following graduation.
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Figure 10: Simulated average earnings two years following graduation
49
